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This paper investigates the impact of managerial overconfidence and firm’s debt decision. 
Dynamic panel models are employed to examine the relationship between managerial 
overconfidence and debt decision of publicly listed companies in Malaysia for the period 
of 2002-2011. The objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between 
managerial overconfidence and firm debt decisions from three perspectives based on 
MARS model. The findings are as follows. (1) When CEOs are motivated, their 
overconfidence is significantly and positively related to debt; (2) CEOs’ ability is 
significantly and positively related to debt; (3) Younger CEOs are taking more risk than 
older CEOs in Malaysian firm. (4) CEO who implement dual leadership structure tends to 
choose less debt; (5) Female CEOs are more confident and prefer more debt in Malaysian 
firms; (6) Firm debt is lower when CEO is also the founder. This study adds to the 
literature on behavioural finance by examining managerial overconfidence and its impact 
to debt decision. The study also makes the methodology contribution by employing 
dynamic panel model to test the effect of managerial overconfidence and corporate debt 
decision. 
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1 Introduction 
Generally, most of the existing empirical 
researches rely on thre main traditional theories 
(Trade off theory, Pecking order theory and Market 
timing theory) in identifying firm debt decision. 
Little empirical evidence linking other potential 
determinants, particularly from the human point of 
view. Logically, individual managers may play a 
role in firm financing choice [1]. Accordingly to 
Friend and Hasbrouck [2], managers with their high 
proportions of personal wealth invested in 
company’s shares will tend to be more conscious in 
reducing firm’s bankruptcy risk. Zwiebel [3] argues 
that manager’s choice in financing decision is a fact 
that cannot be denied. Recent empirical papers 
generally emphasize more on the corporate 
governance and capital structure’s relationship. 
Furthermore, recent empirical papers generally 
emphasize more on the corporate governance and 
capital structure’s relationship. Hasan [4] states that 
most of the corporations implement corporate 
governance to entail processes and structure. With 
that, it helps to facilitate the creation of shareholder 
value. Thus, corporate governance practices would 
definitely have some direct or indirect impact on a 
company’s strategic decision, including external 
financing decision.  
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  On one hand, from conventional perspective, 
Jurevičienė, Bikas [5] emphasize that financial 
contracts and investment behaviour arise from the 
interaction between managers and investors. They 
believe that in the theory of corporate finance, 
managers should make unbiased forecasts of future 
events and use them in making decisions that best 
suit their own interests [6]. On the other hand, from 
modern perspective, corporate finance business 
executives and investors act rationally when taking 
financial decisions. If the assumption of rational 
behaviour is correct, managers can expect that 
capital markets are efficient, implying that stocks 
and bonds are priced correctly at every given 
moment (stock prices correctly reflect the public 
information about their fundamental value). 
 
The objective of this paper is to identify firm debt 
decision from behavioral perspective by examining 
the relationship between managerial 
overconfidence and corporate financing structure in 
Malaysia. The study will examine the preference of 
overconfident managers in their corporate debt 
decision, either more towards debts or equities.  
 
This paper contributes to the financial literature as 
follow. First, this is the first study that empirically 
examines the impact of managerial overconfidence 
behavior as a main independent variable on 
corporate debt decision for Malaysian firms. 
Specifically, this study adds to the literature on 
behavioral finance by examining managerial 
overconfidence, proxied by several CEO 
characteristics and its influence on corporate debt 
decision. Second, we make the methodology 
contribution by employing dynamic panel model to 
test the impact of managerial overconfidence and 
corporate debt decision. 
 
The remaining sections of this study are arranged 
as follows. Section 2 is a literature review. Section 
3 reports data collection and research methodology. 
Section 4 presents the empirical findings and 
analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper and 
proposes some future potential studies. 
1.0 Literature Review 
Existing empirical evidence presents no consistent 
pattern in between the relationship of managerial 
overconfidence and firm debt decision. Majority of 
the psychology studies confirm that people could 
be irrational while making decision and this 
includes the leader of the company. This 
incomplete characteristic includes managerial 
overconfidence. Hilary and Hsu [7] explain that 
‘static’ overconfidence has been shown to be a 
common type of cognitive bias. Kraemer, Nöth [8] 
report that overconfident people always believe that 
they are more accurate their decision making based 
on their private information than it actually is, and 
hence accord it too much weight. Boubaker and 
Mezhoud [9] emphasize as human beings, their 
beliefs and preferences may affect the process of 
decision making when they are not completely 
rational. Generally overconfident CEOs will either 
overestimate or underestimate the return to their 
investment projects and the consequences of 
insufficient internal funds is they curb their 
investment [10].  Hambrick and Cannella [11] 
summarize that the major implications of 
overconfidence managers in their decision making 
are as follows. Firstly, they will tend to invest 
more; Secondly once they invest, they will issue 
more debt and; Thirdly, they face more default risk. 
On the other hand, mild managerial biases will 
contribute to firm performance as they help to 
overcome conflict of interest between bondholders 
and shareholders in positive way.  
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Malmendier and Tate [12] confirm that the 
financing preference of overconfident managers 
may choose to go for internal financing, debt 
financing and then only equity financing. This is 
mainly due to overconfident managers may 
overestimate their abilities to improve firm’s value, 
and thus overestimate the investment project’s 
future cash flows.  
 
Almeida, Ferreira [13] test the top corporate 
managers to evaluate whether their personal 
characteristics will bring significant impacts to 
their investment decision from a unique panel of 
7,000 observations. They interview US firms’ 
CFOs and the findings show that overconfident 
CFOs tend to invest more and use more long term 
debt. Hambrick and Cannella [11] also find out that 
irrational managers choose more debt than rational 
managers. They recommend firms to appoint more 
overconfident managers as they are better at 
shaping and communicating a vision for the firm. 
Furthermore, Abor [14] follow Malmendier and 
Tate [12] to investigate the relation between 
managerial overconfidence and corporate debt 
decisions. By using 2939 forecasts listed 
Taiwanese companies as sample and he concludes 
that optimistic CEOs tend to create more debt issue 
and financing deficit as compared to non-optimistic 
managers.  
 
Graham, Harvey [15] make a comparison to 
distinguish the differences in between US managers 
and non-US firms’ personality characteristics. The 
study adopts a different approach in which they 
gauge managers’ personality traits and attitudes to 
measure peoples’ attitudes. They agree with 
previous studies and conclude that overconfident 
CEOs will use more short term debt in their 
financing decision. Consistently, Fosberg [16] 
supports the argument that overconfident 
entrepreneurs will choose short term debt contracts, 
while rational entrepreneurs will choose long term 
debt contracts. Wei, Min [17] carry out the same 
study by investigating 3969 corporations listed in 
Shanghai and Shenzen stock exchange from 2002 
to 2006. The findings again support that managerial 
irrationality, especially overconfidence does have 
an effect on the financing decisions of firms. They 
conclude that CEOs who are older, longer tenure, 
higher education and not the chairman 
concurrently, these groups of CEO would have 
weaker managerial overconfidence level. Wang, 
Chen [18] compare post-financing stock 
performance for debt-issuing and equity-issuing 
portfolio in Taiwan. They also conclude that 
managerial optimism does affect firm’s choice 
between debt and equity and poor post-financing 
performance. In Heaton [19] model, optimistic 
managers will overvalue thus invest and expand the 
project and firm. Lin, Hu [10] carry out the same 
study in Taiwan too. They investigate a sample of 
8711 forecasts released by 1386 CEOs in 869 
different companies listed on Taiwan Stock 
Exchange for the period from 1985 to 2002. The 
findings indicate that overconfident managers tend 
to have higher investment-cash flow sensitivity 
than non-overconfident managers.  
 
Contrary to it, Jing, Hao [20] have found a different 
finding from their study. They conclude that 
overconfidence of entrepreneur may lead to lower 
corporate value, and it may also make the venture 
enterprise with a negative return from their 
investment. 
 
The impact of managerial overconfidence on firm 
debt decision is an important issue for Malaysia 
and more generally in the transition literature. 
However, existing evidence on the relationship 
between managerial overconfidence and leverage 
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decision is rich; however, the results are mixed and 
do not show a consistent pattern. In other words, 
there is no consensus view about the overall effect 
of managerial behavior on debt decision. Therefore, 
we attempt to extend this line of enquiry, to 
examine whether managerial overconfidence plays 
any significant role in influencing the debt 
decision. 
 
2.0 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Sources of Data 
To form the sample, we choose the sample based 
on the following criteria: (1) The firm is listed in 
Bursa Malaysia before 2002. (2) The firm has a 
complete data of 10 years period from 2004 to 
2013. (3) The firm has a complete report on CEO 
personal characteristics needed (profile photo, 
duality information, educational background, 
previous experience, gender, tenure, age, 
information on founder or non-founder, network, 
previous performance and remuneration) as 
measure of managerial overconfidence’s proxies. 
After removing the unavailable data, the final 
sample is 183 firms.  
 
3.2 Variables Measurement 
To group the variables, we follow MARS model by 
McShane and Travaglione [21] to classify CEO 
characteristics in group. The summary of the 
variables measurement is as follows: 
Variables Description 
Explanatory 
variables 
 
Motivation  
PP Is as dummy variable, one point if 
the CEOs photo in the annual 
report, and zero point it there is 
no photo of CEO. 
NET It is a dummy variable by setting 
1 if CEO is also the member of 
corporate boards (other than the 
CEO’s own firm) and trustee or 
board member of nonprofit 
organizations, otherwise, 0. 
PERF It is calculated as the ratio of 
operating cash flow and total 
assets. Ratio takes value of 0 if it 
does not correspond to current 
CEO’s tenure 
REM It is measured as the ratio of 
average remuneration of the top 3 
managers divided by the average 
remuneration of all top managers 
Ability  
EDU Is a dummy variable to 
distinguish the education level of 
CEO, if CEO’s education is 
above undergraduate, 1; 
otherwise, 0. 
EXP Is a dummy variable for CEO 
experience which code as 1 if he 
or she served as a chief officer 
level executive or a vice president 
in another firm before he or she 
joined the firm under the study 
and 0 if otherwise. 
TEN It is numeric variable which 
express number of years while 
CEO has served the analysed 
company. 
AGE The scale ranges from 1 to 3 to 
measure CEO age as follows: 1 
(CEO age is less than 46 years 
old; 2 (CEO age is between 46 to 
59 years old); and 3 (CEO age is 
more than 59 years old. 
Roles  
DUA Is a dummy variable, assigned 1 if 
the CEO additionally occupies the 
position of the chairman of the 
board, or otherwise, 0. 
GEN It is dummy variable, which code 
as 1 if firm male-owned and 0 if 
otherwise. 
FOUND We set dummy_founder as 1 if 
the CEO of the firm is also a 
founder, otherwise, 0. 
Control 
variables 
OC5 
 
It is calculated by dividing the 
sum of shares held by the largest 
five shareholders by the top 30 
shareholders shares 
ROA It is measured as the ratio of 
earnings before interest and taxes 
to total assets. 
SIZE It is measured by the natural log 
of sales 
TANG It is the ratio of tangibility assets 
(the sum of fixed assets and 
inventories) to total assets 
GROWTH It is measured as the annual 
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percentage change in total sales 
Dependent 
variables 
 
LEVE The ratio of total debts to total 
assets 
LEVE2 The ratio of total debts to total 
equities 
 
 
3.3 Regression models 
In order to examine the relationship between 
managerial overconfidence and firm debt decision, 
the study employs dynamic panel models. Many 
economic and finance issues are dynamic by nature 
and use the panel data structure to understand 
adjustment. Furthermore, empirically 
understanding debt decision arguably requires the 
use of firm fixed effects to control for unobserved, 
time-invariant differences across firms. Yet, 
uncorrected coefficient estimates for a dynamic 
relationship by the presence of a lagged dependent 
variable among the regressor can be severely 
biased. Dynamic panel data allows for dynamic in 
the underlying process may be crucial for 
recovering consistent estimates of other parameter. 
The dynamic relationships are characterized by the 
presence of a lagged dependent variable among 
regressors. 
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where subscripts i and t represent the firm and time 
respectively. αi and βi, i = 1 to 17, are coefficients 
of the respective independent and control variables; 
εit is error term.  
 
 
 
4.0 Results and discussion 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics for firm 
debt and the explanatory variables. With respect to 
the LEVE and LEVE2 measure of firm debt, the 
reported means for LEVE and LEVE2 are 0.449 
and 0.317, respectively. The mean of total debts to 
total assets (LEVE) reveals that the average 
liabilities are about 44.90% of total assets value for 
the sample of Malaysian firms studied. As for 
LEVE2, it indicates that RM0.317 of firm’s 
liability is covered by RM1 of equities. The 
univariate result also shows that Malaysian public 
listed firms use more equities as compared to debt. 
In terms of CEO personal characteristics, 
averagely, Malaysian CEOs do not disclose their 
profile photos or no photo of CEOs in company’s 
annual report. In terms of dual leadership structure, 
with the mean of 0.226, it implies that majority of 
the Malaysian CEOs do not hold two positions. 
They are only the CEO of the company but not the 
chairman at the same time.  This could be due to 
the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
(2000) has established a new set of best-practice 
guidelines that recommend that companies avoid 
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duality to ensure proper checks and balances at the 
level of the top leadership of corporations. 
Although compliance with best practices is 
voluntary, in recognizing the importance of 
corporate governance in the context of the global 
capital market, the Bursa Malaysia has taken a 
leading role in enhancing the standard of Malaysian 
corporate governance practices of listed issuers.  
 
The descriptive statistics with the education level’s 
mean of 0.646 also shows that Malaysian CEOs 
have earned at least undergraduate degree as their 
minimum education level. About 60.7 per cent of 
CEOs served as a CO level executive. Moreover, 
the statistics also identifies majority of the 
Malaysian CEOs are males and only 2.3 per cent 
CEOs are females. Other than that, generally they 
have been holding the CEO position for 10 to 11 
years in the same company. In terms of age group, 
majority of Malaysian CEOs are in group 2 which 
is averagely in between 46 to 59 years old. The 
finding also reveal that most of the Malaysian 
CEOs are not founder of the company he or she 
served. In terms of network, observed CEO serves 
at least as a corporate board other than the CEO’s 
own firm or nonprofit organizations. The mean for 
operating cash flow and total assets as a measure of 
CEO performance is -4.737 and it is relatively low. 
This indicates that majority of Malaysian CEOs do 
not perform well as compared to previous year. As 
for remuneration, the mean of 0.812 reveals that 
81.2% of the total directors’ remuneration is paid 
for CEO and the other top 2 directors. Furthermore, 
the descriptive statistics also indicates the five 
largest shareholders are holding 69.3 per cent of the 
company’s shares in average and the samples are 
considered as having high ownership concentration. 
The mean ROA of 0.046 indicates that 4.6 per cent 
of profit is generated from total assets. Firm size of 
12.231 shows that sales of firm is RM12.231 
million in average. About 52.0 per cent of firm’s 
total assets are made up of fixed assets. Finally, 
firm average growth for the observed period is 
about 0.3 percent. 
4.2 Regression results 
We use system GMM to estimate the dynamic debt 
decision model in equation (1) for all firms from 
2002 to 2011. Table 2 shows the results of system 
GMM. Before performing our final system GMM, 
we perform some diagnostic tests. A 
multicollinearity test was conducted to check for 
correlation among the regressors. Setting the cut-
off value for VIF at 5, we find no multicollinearity. 
The Sargan Test (P > 0.05) indicates that 
overidentifying restrictions are valid. The presence 
of first order serial correlation (P < 0.05) and 
second order serial correlation (P > 0.05) imply the 
model is in line with GMM.  LEVEt-1 is the 
coefficient for the lagged dependent variable and is 
significant at the 1% level. From the values of 
coefficient, 0.740 (one step) and 0.789 (two step), it 
indicates that Malaysian public listed firms adjust 
debt towards an optimal level and the spend of 
adjustment is approximately 21% to 26% per 
annum.  
In the terms of managerial overconfidence based on 
motivation context, the coefficient of PP shows that 
CEOs who disclose their profile photo will choose 
more debt as their overconfidence level is higher. 
Other than that, the positive coefficients for PERF 
and REM show that CEO with better performance 
and higher remuneration which indicating higher 
confidence level will carry more debt.  
With regards to ability, the positive coefficients of 
EDU and EXP confirm that CEOs with higher 
education level, more experience and longer tenure 
will tend to hold more debts for the firms. This 
could be explained as CEO with higher confidence 
level will prefer more debts when he or she obtains 
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at least undergraduate degree, more experience and 
longer service in the same firm. This is consistent 
with Bantel and Jackson [22] who agree that highly 
educated top managers, are positively related to 
strategic change for a better firm’s growth.  
However, the empirical finding reveals that older 
CEOs prefer less debt. Vroom and Pahl [23] 
explain that older managers tend to be more risk 
averse whereas young manager are more willing to 
undertake risky innovative growth strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean SD Maximum Minimum 
LEVE 0.449 0.329 0.992 0.010 
LEVE2 0.317 0.330 5.54 0.000 
PP 0.239 0.426 1.000 0.000 
NET 0.792 1.305 1.000 0.000 
PERF -4.737 2.687 58.880 -12.963 
REM 0.812 0.209 3.053 0.000 
EDU 0.646 0.478 1.000 0.000 
EXP 0.607 1.164 19.000 0.000 
TEN 10.199 8.080 40.000 0.000 
AGE 2.038 0.621 1.000 3.000 
DUA 0.226 0.418 1.000 0.000 
GEN 0.977 0.160 1.000 0.000 
FOUND 0.310 0.463 1.000 0.000 
OC5 0.693 0.153 1.000 0.000 
ROA 0.046 0.120 0.723 -1.390 
SIZE 12.231 1.487 16.616 2.398 
TANG 0.520 0.034 0.990 -0.633 
GROWTH 0.003 0.040 0.230 -1.000 
     
 
Besides that, in terms of roles context, the study 
finds some interesting findings for Malaysian 
public listed firms. CEOs with dual leadership 
structure prefer less debt. Other that that, female 
CEOs are more confident than male, thus, choose 
more debt in Malaysian firms. The finding also 
indicate that CEO who is also founder may use 
more time to reduce the potential bias in decision 
making, hence choose less debt. 
 
As for robust check, we re-estimate the models by 
replacing LEVE with the ratio of total debt to total 
equities (LEVE2). The estimation results with two-
step Difference GMM and two-step System GMM 
in Table 3 remains qualitatively the same except for 
DUA. 
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Table 2: Regression result of Panel Data Analysis-Main effect 
Variables One-step System  
GMM 
Two-step System 
GMM 
Model 1 Model 1 
Intercept -1.961*** (-5.83) -2.226*** (-5.55) 
Debtt-1 0.740*** (11.41) 0.789*** (17.83) 
Motivation   
PP 0.031 (0.65) 0.051** (2.02) 
NET 0.017 (1.21) 0.003 (0.31) 
PERF -0.002 (-0.78) 0.002*** (13.24) 
REM 0.111** (1.83) 0.019*** (3.48) 
Ability   
EDU 0.083* (1.42) 0.055* (1.33) 
EXP 0.319*** (7.47) 0.236*** (5.17) 
TEN 0.008*** (-2.98) 0.003* (-1.31) 
AGE -0.067*** (-2.89) -0.016** (-1.75) 
Roles   
DUA -0.118** (-2.19) -0.241*** (-12.39) 
GEN -0.319*** (-3.18) -0.204** (-2.13) 
FOUND -0.179** (-2.29) -0.059 (-1.01) 
OC5 0.425*** (3.48) 0.176*** (3.33) 
ROA -0.107*** (-7.82) -0.641*** (-8.81) 
SIZE -0.107*** (-7.82) -0.073*** (-3.87) 
TANG 39.763*** (10.33) 37.160*** (15.96) 
GROWTH 0.3512** (1.81) 0.523*** (6.24) 
Year dummy Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes 
Specification tests   
Sargan 674.61 (0.4569) 578.887 (0.6422) 
Autorcorrelation 1  -1.623 (0.045)** 
Autorcorrelation 2  0.939 (0.348) 
Note: Dependent variable = LEVE for model 1; t-statistics in brackets, *, **, and *** denote the statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Regression result of Panel Data Analysis-Robust check 
Variables Two-step Difference  
GMM 
Two-step System 
GMM 
Model 2 Model 2 
Intercept 0.253** (1.74) 0.559*** (5.01) 
LEVE2t-1 0.602*** (22.51) 0.748*** (24.74) 
Motivation   
PP 0.046*** (2.85) 0.092*** (5.11) 
NET 0.034*** (4.85) 0.011*(1.91) 
PERF 0.009** (-2.02) 0.002*** (2.97) 
REM 0.038*** (2.53) 0.068*** (4.43) 
Ability   
EDU 0.133*** (3.79) 0.176***(5.92) 
EXP 0.050*** (2.50) 0.081*** (3.46) 
TEN 0.002** (1.83) 0.002 (1.54) 
AGE -0.001 (-0.18) 0.0045 (0.67) 
Roles   
DUA 0.016* (1.48) 0.004 (0.03) 
GEN -0.117*** (2.56) -0.166*** (3.28) 
FOUND -0.065** (-2.15) -0.105*** (-3.44) 
OC5 -0.185*** (-2.36) -0.307*** (-4.69) 
ROA -0.372*** (-8.55) -0.505*** (-9.41) 
SIZE 0.004 (0.49) -0.012* (-1.86) 
TANG -0.342 (-0.60) 0.041 (0.07) 
GROWTH 0.531*** (3.68) 0.590*** (4.46) 
Year dummy Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes 
   
Specification tests   
Sargan 53.781 (0.221) 691.759 (0.695) 
Autorcorrelation 1 -1.454** (0.046) -1.459** (0.045) 
Autorcorrelation 2 0.022 (0.982) 0.939 (0.348) 
Note: Dependent variable = LEVE2 for model 2; t-statistics in brackets, *, **, and *** denote the 
statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
This study examines the relationship between 
managerial overconfidence and firm’s debt 
decision for the period from 2002 to 2011. The 
findings can be summarized as follows. (1) When 
CEOs are motivated (profile photo disclosure, 
better performance and higher remuneration), their 
overconfidence is significantly and positively 
related to debt; (2) CEOs’ abilities (higher 
education, more experience and longer tenure) are 
significantly and positively related to debt; (3) 
Younger CEOs are taking more risk than older 
CEOs in Malaysian firm. (4) CEO who implement 
dual leadership structure tends to choose less debt;  
 
(5) Female CEOs are more confident and prefer 
more debt in Malaysian firms; (6) Firm debt is 
lower when CEO is also the founder. 
Of course, our measurement of managerial 
overconfidence may have shortcomings. More 
direct measurements may be considered in the 
future. In addition, there may have been other 
incentives that we have not examined; we have 
shown that the most obvious (at least to us) 
possible CEO personal characteristics in 
determining debt decision. One obvious future 
empirical extension to this study is to explore the 
effect of CEO political background and CEO race 
on cost of debt. It was also particularly time-
consuming to hand collect the CEO information 
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from the annual reports of our sample 
companies.om the annual reports of our sample 
companies. 
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